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1 Introduction
As people across the world become increasingly aware of how their privacy is
compromised in this digital era, the field of Privacy Enhancing Technologies, or
PETs, has boomed. The first workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technology was
in 2000, then called the ”Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unob-
servability” [1]. By 2007, the workshop had ballooned into a full symposium. In
2015, the first issue of the Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies jour-
nal was published [2]. This year in 2019, there were 4 volumes of Proceedings on
Privacy Enhancing Technologies published, containing a total of 66 papers. Of
these papers, we identified 14 which specifically describe PETs that have been
newly developed or utilized in a new way. We focused on 3 papers that seemed
to have widespread use cases. Some of these use cases, however, include crimi-
nal activity. While heavily focused on adversarial actions and capability, much
of security research does not focus on or consider the social science and moti-
vations behind bad actors. We believe that this is a critical factor to consider
when working on the problem of cybercrime. In this paper, we will analyze some
of the cutting edge PETs and the potential risks associated with them from the
lenses of computer science and criminal justice. We argue that the continued
development of privacy enhancing technology contributes to the global rise of
cybercrime.
2 Crime
The field of Criminal Justice is built on theories. Researchers will examine
crime data and try to find patterns based off of criminology, sociology, psychol-
ogy, and even economics. These theories focus on different elements of crime,
such as the different types of crime, the different types of offenders, how to deal
with crime after it happens, and how to deal with crime before it happens.
The idea of deterrence is a continuously researched topic in the field of
Criminal Justice that focuses on trying to deal with crime before it happens.
Researchers hope to understand how we can de-incentivise and prevent criminal
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behaviors by making the risk greater than the reward. The theory of deterrence
was first proposed by Italian philosopher and economist Cesare Beccaria in
the 1700s [3]. According to Beccaria, there are three factors of a punishment
that determine if the punishment will deter criminal action. These factors are
severity, celerity, and certainty.
Since then, the different weights of these factors, and their impact on de-
terrence at all, have been questioned [4]. Research has shown that the severity
of punishment might have the opposite effect; offenders that have faced strict
punishment are often more likely to reoffend . The swiftness of punishment has
been observed to have little effect at all [5]. Certainty, however, does have a
measurable deterrent effect. This has been proven in multiple studies across the
world, both in macro- and micro-level contexts [6].
A more recent theory that has grown out of the idea of deterrence is crime
prevention. There are three main forms of crime prevention that have been
agreed upon within the field: situational crime prevention, developmental crime
prevention, and community crime prevention. Situational crime prevention,
or SCP, focuses on proximate causes of crime. As the name suggests, SCP
focuses on how to decrease a specific crime within a specific context. Its goal
is to prevent crime by eliminating or reducing conditions that make a criminal
offense more likely to occur. It draws heavily on economic theory about decision
making [7].
In 2003, two Criminal Justice scholars Cornish and Clarke identified 25 spe-
cific techniques of crime prevention. Many of these techniques directly conflict
with privacy, specifically those within the ”Increase the Risks” category. This
category is rather self-explanatory and highlights techniques that increase the
risks of performing criminal activities. The two techniques most at odds with
privacy are ”reduce anonymity” and ”strengthen formal surveillance.” [8]
3 Privacy Technology
Privacy technology increases anonymity, and in doing so shrinks the cer-
tainty factor of deterrence from cybercrime to almost nothing. In this way, the
development of PETs is in direct conflict with crime prevention. One of the
most famous PETs is Tor. An acronym for ”The Onion Router,” Tor is a ser-
vice that sends messages with layers of encryption between multiple endpoints
to obfuscate network traffic and provide anonymity for users. According to
RSA, the group that utilizes Tor the most is cybercriminals. Tors criminal use
cases include: the trade of stolen financial data, financial fraud, illegal sexual
content, bypassing censorship, drug trafficking, weapons trading, gambling, and
the sale of stolen goods [9].
Tor is also a popular area of security research. One of the 2019 PoPETs
papers was, ”DPSelect: A Differential Privacy Based Guard Relay Selection
Algorithm for Tor” [10]. Researchers have recently identified a system-wide
vulnerability of Tor against network-level adversaries, which includes govern-
ments and other large policing bodies. These adversaries can analyze traffic
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to glean information about users. In addition to passive attacks, researchers
have found that Tor users can be de-anonymized using active attacks that tar-
get BGP. There has been a proposed counter to this particular attack, called
Counter-RAPTOR. Counter-RAPTOR uses a ”guard relay selection algorithm”
to select guard relays with a high resilience to BGP hijacking attacks. In Tor,
guard relays are the first ”messengers” in the relay system, taking a message
from the users IP, packaging it, and sending it to another layer. As a result of
having access to IPs, guard relays have to be more trusted and resilient than
other nodes in the Tor ecosystem.
Hanley et al propose a new guard relay selection algorithm called DPSelect
that uses differential privacy to improve upon Counter-RAPTOR, which can
leak information through the decrease in randomness of guard relay selection
because it is location based. Over time, an adversary could start seeing pat-
terns in which guard relays are selected, and learn more about the Tor users.
DPSelect mitigates this by including a ”Max-Divergence” metric to adjust the
likelihood of a particular potential guard relay being chosen. Max-Divergence
is equal to the natural log of the highest probability of choosing a specific guard
relay over the lowest probability of picking that relay. In a truly random sce-
nario, each relay has an equal chance of being picked, so you get ln(1), which is
equal to 0. By setting the Max-Divergence, the algorithm roughly determines
how far from truly random you are willing to go, which determines how much
information could be leaked. A higher Max-Divergence means a higher devia-
tion from random. The Max-Divergence of DPSelect was 0.67 in the average
case and 1.05 in the worst case, compared to Counter-RAPTOR with 1.3 in
the average case and 7 in the worst case. Ultimately, this means that the new
DPSelect algorithm reduces the ability for network-level actors to de-identify
Tor users.
Another paper looks at the flaws of Tor and proposes an entire alternative
service in, ConsenSGX: Scaling Anonymous Communications Networks with
Trusted Execution Environments” [11]. In their design, ORAM protocols are
utilized to fetch smaller portions of the full network without revealing the ad-
dress space they learned about so as to minimize an adversarys ability to attack
the network. ORAM stands for Oblivious RAM; its a cryptographic tool to pre-
vent the exposure of information to anyone observing memory access patterns.
This team set out to design a network that is scalable, efficient, and requires
minimal changes to the underlying Tor architecture.
On the server side, they built their network protocols on top of Tors. The
main difference is how ConsenSGX does directory authorities. Each directory
authority distributes its own parameters. These parameters contain all things
that are not for an individual relay like protocol version, network features, and
the number of relays in the different pools (as well as the bandwidth for these
pools.) The directory authorities also need to verify the caches that serve the
protocol. Each of the DAs has a long TTL signature verification key that is
then used to sign an ephemeral asymmetric keypair. This key is then used to
verify what the protocol calls an attestation. Once verified, the server responds
with descriptions of available relays. This process can only work if a client
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knows if a node supports ConsenSGX.On the client side, like the Tor protocol,
they connect to a DA authenticating and verify using the DAs public key. Once
authenticated to the DA, the client selects a relay to connect to.
In the evaluation of the ConsenSGX, the team found that the protocol is
faster than its PIR-Tor counterpart. This speed increase is because the time
complexity of client queries in ConsenSGX is log3(N), whereas Tor is O(N).
Beyond the time complexity benefits, The amount of bandwidth required is
also less. These benefits makes it easy to deploy a ConsenSGX node. The
ConsenSGX scheme is built on top of Intel SGX as its Trusted Execution Envi-
ronments. This scheme was shown to be an effective implementation for scalable
anonymous networks.
Anonymous communication is another tool that can help enable cybercrime.
A new covert channel called Tithonus was developed by Recabarren and Car-
bunar and described in their paper, ”Tithonus: A Bitcoin Based Censorship
Resilient System” [12]. It is specifically designed to not be able to be brought
down by state level actors, which are typically the ones trying to catch and
prevent illegal activities. Tithonus uses Bitcoins gossip protocol rather than
relying on full consensus. The authors try to provide 6 properties. First is
unobservability, which guarantees that a censor would be unable to detect com-
munications even if they can inspect packets and corresponding metadata. This
is measured in both unobservable access to received messages as well as sent
messages that are indistinguishable from normal Bitcoin usage. Next, unblock-
ability says that the censor is unable or unwilling to block communications even
if the unobservability property was unable to be achieved because that would
mean disrupting normal function of the blockchain. Availability promises that
the system is resilient to DOS attacks. Tithonus hampers DOS attacks by re-
quiring that requests be paid upfront, so that all interaction with the system
forces the users to invest resources. Communication integrity says that com-
munications between the user and the destination should not be able to be
modified. The property of ease of deployment is fairly self explanatory. Along
with being easy to bootstrap and deploy, Tithonus does not require altruistic
participation (when clients download blockchain content and persist it with no
remuneration). Finally, performance promises that the system minimizes cost
while maximizing the amount of useful information sent over time.
Tithonus utilizes a complex communication stack to achieve its goals. The
lowest layer embeds data into transactions, the next optimizes transactions fees,
the one after that sends messages of random size, the next establishes trust, the
layer on top of that allows the client to securely communicate with the system,
and the final layer is the application layer, providing the interface. Based on the
ease of deployment property, users dont need to understand or be aware of the
intricacies of the implementation. Tithonus even limits the amount of content
a client can request per day to be consistent with regular Bitcoin users which
provides further obscurity for users.
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4 Conclusion
According to Criminal Justice theory that has been developed and tested
over centuries, the more certain someone is that they can commit a crime and
get away with it, the more likely they are to do so. The developments in Privacy
Enhancing Technologies have only made it easier to commit a crime undetected.
PETs prevent governments and other policing bodies from being able to detect,
monitor, track, and even prove criminal activity. Improvements in Tor further
prevent users from being identified. Alternatives to Tor allow the technology to
take root at a much larger scale. Breakthroughs in covert communication chan-
nels facilitate the planning and conducting of criminal activity. Disabling the
ability to combat cybercrime is an important ethical concern. While preserving
privacy is a noble goal, researchers must consider how their developments might
be used.
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